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*The views expressed here are my own and do not necessarily represent those of the Central Bank of Turkey. I 
am thankful to  DevrimYavuz for helping me with the data, to Kivilcim Metin  for clarifying seasonality issues 
and to Erdal Ozmen for taking time to read my paper and for his very helpful comments.  Abstract 
As  monetary  targeting  lost  its  credibility  and  began  to  be  replaced  by  inflation  targeting,  more  and  more 
countries chose to inflation target. Meanwhile the role of money is completely forgotten. This paper  investigates 
the  existence  of  a  stable  long  run  base  money  demand  and  try  to  show  that  money  could  play  at  least 
informational role even for a country like Turkey who is at the present implicitly inflation targeting and heading 
along the direction of explicit inflation targeting. When the fragility of the banking sector and fiscal dominance 
problems are solved and when the central bank can increase the overnight interest rates if the need arises without 
jeopardizing  either the fiscal balance or the banking sector balance sheets, the conditions for inflation targeting 




In  the  1970’s,  inflation  was  accepted  basically  as  a  monetary  phenomenon,  there  was  a 
causality relation between money and prices and hence to achieve price stability monetary 
targeting was used. However, in time, continuous overprediction of real balances, as well as 
difficulties  in  explaining  or  predicting  movements  in  velocity,  led  to  the  conclusion  that 
money demand was unstable and its relation with price level was broken. Several reasons 
were attributed to this instability; one was financial liberalization and financial innovation, 
another  was  currency  substitution,  yet  others  were  institutional  reforms,  regulation, 
deregulation.  Martina  Copelman(1996)  investigated  the  effects  of  financial  innovation  on 
money demand  for Bolivia, Venezuela and Israel  and showed that  by increasing the speed 
of adjustment to money demand and its determinants, financial innovation can lead to money 
demand instability. 
Siriram(1999) claims that the second major reason contributing to money demand instability 
was the inadequacy of partial adjustment models used in estimating money demand. Engel 
and Granger (1987) indicated that these models, by ignoring the stationarity properties of the 
data may lead to incorrect specification and misleading conclusions.The existence of lagged 
dependent variable and the adjustment cost for the actual level to reach the desired level was 
suspected to cause the observed instability. Hence, apparent fragility of money demand in 
recent years may not only be stemming from the institutional changes in financial markets but 
also from the apparent inadequate modeling of the transmission mechanisms. 
The  search  for  solutions  to  improve  the  econometric  problems  associated  with  partial 
adjustment models eventually led to error correction models. 
Whatever were the reasons for the acclaimed failure of monetary aggregates, recently the 
trend  has  shifted  from  monetary  targeting  to  inflation  targeting.  Although  advocates  of 
inflation  targeting  regime  claim  that  the  central  banks  should  not  take  into  account  the 
movements in money in formulating monetary policy (Estrella and Mishkin (1997), Bernanke 
et al (1999), Svensson (1999)), monetary aggregates could still play several roles and hence it 
may  be  useful  to  follow  their  developments  closely  for  central  banks  even  in  inflation 
targeting regimes. According to Soderstrom ( 2001), it could help stabilizing expectations in a 
model with forward looking expectations. Additionally, monetary aggregates could also play 
1)Indicator  role  for  future  inflation  2)  Information  role  regarding  other  variables  that 
influence inflation 3)Transmission role for credit channel given that money and credit are 
closely related. 
Soderstorm (2001) argues that  ECB gives a prominent role for M3 by taking its growth rate 
as a reference value for the conduct of monetary policy in the pursuit of its price stability 
goal. He claims that there is scope for using money growth target to improve on discretionary 
monetary policy, which inflation targeters resort to. 
Altimari  (2001)  has  investigated  leading  indicator  properties  of  different  money  based 
indicators  in  predicting  future  inflation  and  compared  it  to  other  leading  indicators  of 
inflation,  their  result  support  the  view  that  monetary  aggregates  provide  significant  and 
independent information for  future price developments. Given this background and also given the fact that Turkey is heading in the direction of 
inflation targeting, this paper will investigate the existence of a stable long run base money 
demand using Johansen cointegration tecnique. In this respect, section II will give background 
for  Turkish monetary targeting experience. Section III will describe the long run base money 
demand equation with IIIA on short run dynamics of inflation equation. Section IV and IV A  
will discuss broad money namely Real M2Y cointegration results and its short run dynamics 




In  Turkey  starting  from  1986,  the  Central  Bank  began  monetary  programming  exercises 
unofficially, i.e. they were not announced to the public due to likely credibility loss in case of 
not meeting the targets. It was through these exercises, that came the understanding that for 
any monetary programming to be successful, it was first necessary to discipline the public 
finances. In Turkey, inflation was widely believed to be a fiscal phenomenon and it was 
thought that the monetized budget deficits that was the main cause of inflation. 
To  this  end,  the  Central  Bank  signed  a  protocol  with  the  Treasury  in  1989  to  limit  the 
Treasury borrowing from the Central Bank and following that, the first official monetary 
programming  was  announced  in  1990.  With  this  program,  the  Central  Bank  aimed  at 
controlling its own balance sheet and successfully implemented the program till the break out 
of the Gulf War in 1991 which rendered any programming ineffective. 
In general, monetary programming in Turkey was interrupted either through a foreign shock 
like the Gulf crisis in 1991 or domestic shock like elections in 1992,1995 or 1996 or financial 
crisis as in 1994. 
Needless to say, worsening of public finances was the main reason behind all unsuccessful 
monetary  programs.  Like  in  1992,  even  though  a  monetary  program  was  announced, 
increasing public sector credits carried over from 1991 went out of control. Increasing the 
liquidity  in  the  market  and  the  resulting  increase  in  open  market  operations  and  foreign 
exchange interventions, increased the Central Bank liabilities in 1993 which again rendered 
any  programming  ineffective  and  hence  instead  of  trying  to  implement  the  program,  the 
Central Bank chose to minimize the fluctuations in exchange rates. 
In addition to the macro imbalances, government’s interference in the securities market by 
canceling  auctions  to  decrease  Treasury  interest  rates,  triggered  the  1994  crisis  and 
culminated in April 5 stabilization package.  As part of the package, a one-off tax, coupled 
with increases in public prices corrected the budget deficit but had pushed the inflation rate 
over 150%, stagnated the economy with 6 % GNP decline. The situation improved in 1995, 
with growth and foreign reserves picking up, inflation and current account declining, till the 
last two months of 1995 with the call for early elections which again increased the public 
spending,  led  to  the  expansion  of  the  domestic  assets  of  the  central  bank  and  hence 
inflationary expectations. In such periods when no explicit target is in the horizon or the 
implementation of the program becomes difficult, either due to political uncertainties or to 
increasing public sector credits  or foreign originated crisis or the like, the Central Bank, 
mainly focused on the smooth functioning of the financial markets. 1996 was a politically 
unstable  year,  the  coalition  government  which  took  3  months  to  form  followed  a  tight 
monetary policy but public finances were getting out of hand, hence increasing public prices 
with increasing inflation was the only way out, finally coalition government collapsed in the 
middle of the year. Hence in such a politically unstable environment with weak coalition 
governments and increasing public sector deficits, the Central Bank again had an internal, but 
publicly  unannounced  monetary  and  exchange  rate  policy.  In  both  1996,  and  1997,  the 
Central Bank tried to limit the increase in domestic credit to the public and allowed the increase in reserve money to be in line with increases in net international reserves, while 
following more or less a real exchange rate rule. Between 1994 and 1997, the growth rate of 
domestic assets has slowed down gradually, declined by 48% in nominal terms. In fact, short 
term advancement facility between the Central Bank and the Treasury totally closed down in 
July due to a protocol signed by the two institutions.  
In 1998, for the first time, the budget was designed to have a primary surplus and monetary 
policy was supportive of the fiscal policy and chose reserve money as the target variable, 
again the source of the increase of reserve money was designated to be the increase in foreign 
assets. In the second half of the year, following an agreement with IMF, the targeted variable 
was  changed  from  reserve  money  to  net  domestic  asset,  the  reason  being  the  possible 
unpredictable shifts in money demand due to decreasing inflation. Throughout the year, the 
Central Bank remained within the target, in spite of the Russian Crisis, which reversed the 
decreasing interest rates trend at home and made it difficult for the Treasury to borrow both 
internally and internationally. The real effects of the Russian crisis were felt more in 1999 in 
the  Turkish  economy,  GNP  growth  rate  declined  due  to  demand  shortage  and  high  real 
interest rates caused fiscal position to deteriorate. In addition, political uncertainty regarding 
elections as well as a major earthquake made it a difficult year, however, increase in capital 
inflows made it possible for domestic assets to grow in line with the target regardless of these 
difficulties. 
Nevertheless, the urgency of the economic situation forced the Central Bank to adopt an IMF 
supported major stabilization and disinflation program at the end of 1999 based on exchange 
rate  targeting.  The  program  envisaged  a quasi currency  board system with  preannounced 
exchange rate depreciation as well as  performance criteria on net domestic assets, assuming 
that the base money demand increase would be met by increase in net foreign assets. Initially 
the program was credible and successful in meeting the targets, in reducing interest rates, 
however, towards the end of the year, growing current account deficit as well slowing down 
of  privatization  efforts,  lowered  the  program  credibility,  creating  doubts  regarding  its 
sustainability. Mini crisis lived in November exacerbated this loss of confidence, carrying it to 
the next year. Finally, in 2001, the spread of the liquidity shortage of one bank to the others   
triggered the banking crisis in February, skyrocketing the interest rates, as well as increasing 
the demand for foreign exchange, finally forcing government to abandon the program, letting 
currency to float. After the crisis, in the first four months of the year, The Central Bank could 
only try to stabilize the markets, helping banks to meet their financing needs by lowering 
short term rates, meeting the overnight borrowing needs of public and fund banks so as to 
prevent  it  from  crowding  out  those  of  the  others  in  the  system,  trying  to  meet  foreign 
exchange demand of banks who were caught with open positions by the crisis, by regularly 
opening foreign exchange sales auctions and the like. Starting from mid May, the Central 
Bank  announced  that  till  the  conditions  for  inflation  targeting  regime  were  realized,  the 
Central Bank was going to target base money as nominal anchor. In the rest of the year, 
preparations slowly in line with inflation targeting were made. First, the Central Banking law 
was passed which would render its independence, which is a must for inflation targeting 
regime,  and  the  Central  Bank  changed  short  term  interest  rates  in  line  with  inflationary 
expectations in preparation for the inflation targeting regime. In 2002, while the effect of the 
crisis  was  still  felt,  again base  money  was  chosen as the nominal anchor  as well as the 
performance criteria together with net international reserves. The sustainability of domestic 
debt was creating confidence problem in the beginning of the year, but strong adherence to 
the program as well as financial support provided by IMF helped to overcome this problem, 
credibility was gained back which reduced inflation as well as inflationary expectations with 
the help of weak domestic demand, which also facilitated the Central Bank to lower short 
term interest rates. The second half of the year till November was characterized by uncertainty regarding political elections. After November, that was cleared, the targets were met and short 
term interest rates were lowered even more. In 2003, the conditions for inflation targeting was 
still not  ripe, hence the Central  Bank continued using implicit inflation targeting. In this 
respect,  base  money  was  chosen  as  performance  criteria  together  with  net  international 
reserves floor. At the present the Turkish economy, although in a much better shape than 
before, is still suffering from fiscal dominance, banking sector is still fragile, both of which 
implies the asymmetric use of overnight rates which is one of the basic tools of monetary 
policy in inflation targeting i.e. it is all right to decrease the overnight rates but if they have to 
be increased which inflation targeting may require that is going to pressure both the fiscal 
position and the banking sector. 
 
III) LONG RUN REAL BASE MONEY DEMAND 
 
To estimate the long run real monetary base, Johansen(1988) cointegration methodology is 
used.  The  variables  used  are  real  monetary  base,  where  base  money  is  deflated  by  cpi, 
monthly  GNP  interpolated  from  quarterly  series  using  Fernandez(1981) methodology  and 
opportunity cost variables, namely,  treasury bill rate, exchange rate depreciation and forward 
inflation assuming rational expectations. Data is monthly, seasonally unadjusted and covers 
the period from 1992:6 to 2003:9. 
For the opportunity cost variables monetary theory for the portfolio decision indicates to use 
variety  of  returns  for  alternative  assets.  However  for  econometric  considerations  like 
collinearity, usually one representative rate is taken into account. There is a debate over the 
use of short term or the long term rate as the representative interest rate for money demand 
among the economists. Ando and Shell (1975) who assume perfect capital markets, argue for 
the inclusion of short term rate. They claim that the rate of return for the long term assets 
determine the allocation between such assets but does not influence money demand while 
Baba et al (1992) in their work showed that if capital market imperfections are included in 
Ando and Shell model, the long rate influences the money demand. 
In practice this question has to do with the amount of debt stock, fiscal sustainability and the 
level of inflation the country is experiencing. In this paper, the long run rate, 3 month treasury 
bill rate (mtbill) is used for the simple reason that inclusion of overnight rates gives a positive 
sign with real base money demand which would imply for example, in the case of monetary 
tightening,  the  higher  the  overnight  rate  the  more  money  is  demanded  which  is  a rather 
perverse result, but inclusion of treasury bill rate gives the proper negative sign as expected. 
The other opportunity cost variables inflation and exchange rate enter into the equation as 
forward change assuming rational expectations i.e. that agents expect in period t, the inflation 
that will materialize in (t+1)st period. The same is assumed for exchange rate depreciation. 
The reason being, that treasury bill is a future yield on monthly assets holding, so for inflation 
and exchange rate depreciation to be comparable to monthly treasury bill yield it has to refer 
to the same period, not to the past. Also, in inflation targeting, expected rather than actual 
inflation is used. 
The reason for including inflation in addition to interest rates is that, those two variables do 
not necessarily follow the same path exactly. Laidler (1985) argues that variation in interest 
rates do not fully reflect variation in expected inflation rate for some unexplained reason. 
Hence this leaves a room for interest rates as well as expected inflation rate to play role in 
demand for money function. The same is also true for exchange rate depreciation, exchange 
rates may react to a shock while it may take some time for inflation to react, since pass 
through is not always the same but may be varying, depending on the nature of the monetary 


























































































































mean  high  pass  through.  In  addition  exchange  rate  depreciation  can  be  an  indicator  of 
currency substitution and hence has a role in money demand function. 
 
 
Base money is calculated as the sum of currency in circulation, required reserves and free 
deposits and is deflated by CPI. Given the monthly treasury bill (mtbill), change in exchange 
rate (Dlexf), inflation expectations (inff), real monthly gnp (lrgnp) and 11 seasonal dummies, 
real base money demand (lrbm) is tested for cointegration using Johansen (1988) procedure. 
Before going ahead with the estimation, the variables are checked for stationarity. Table I  
which gives the result of likelihood ratio tests where null is stationarity, indicates that all the 
variables are nonstationary (have  values greater than chi square 5% critical value of 9.40) 
To check whether that nonstationarity means they are  I(1) or I(2), Dickey Pantula(1987) 
procedure for higher order is applied i.e variables are first checked for differences then for 
levels and the results indicate that they are all I(1)(Table II) 
Table III indicates that null of 0 cointegrating vectors against the alternative of greater than or 
equal to 1 cointegrating vector for base money is rejected both by the 99% and 95% critical 
value for the trace test and that there is one cointegrating vector is accepted. 
 
Cointegrating Equation Normalized for real base money(LRBM) is 
 
LRBM = -0.806 MTBILL –0.926 INFF –0.243 DLEXF +0.850 LRGNP 
 
Optimal lag length using VAR sequential system reduction procedure gives 15 lags according 
to likelihood ratio test. Weak exogeneity results indicate (Table IV) that real gnp and treasury 
bill rate are weakly exogenous, inflation and change in exchange rate marginally pass the chi 
square critical value at 5%, and hence endogenous, real base money is also endogenous. The 
results also show that real base money is positively related to real gnp and negatively related 
to opportunity cost variables as expected. The long run equation passed all the autocorrelation 
tests (see appendix) and failed to pass normality but cointegration results are robust  to excess 
curtosis (Gonzalo 1994).  
To check for the stability of the cointegrating relation, recursive estimation along the lines of 
Hansen and Johansen (1993) is used. They suggest using recursive estimation analysis as a 
misspecification test for possible nonconstancies. The graph in the appendix, where test of 
known beta equation to beta(t )is shown, there are two representations. The Z representation 
where all the parameters in the model are reestimated in each period, and the R representation, 
where short run parameters are fixed and only long run parameters are reestimated. The R 
representation  and  the  plot  of  eigenvalue  which  lies  between  the  95%  confidence  bands support  the  conclusion  of  constant  cointegration  space  and  constant  cointegration  rank. 
Previously Ozatay (1997) has tested the existence of a long run stationary reserve money for 
Turkey between 1977:1 and 1995:III with quarterly data and found that stationary long run 
reserve money exists for Turkey inspite of the rapidly changing financial environment in 
which the estimation takes place. 
As a separate exercise to isolate the effects of change in required reserves on base money, a 
fictitious base money is calculated where required reserves are assumed to be constant at %3 
throughout the estimation period. Then the calculated base money is tested for cointegration 
using  the  same  variables  as  in  the  case  of  actual  base  money.  The  results  indicate  that 
calculated base money (LRBMC) has lower elasticity for all the variables except for real gap 
as reported below. 
 
LRBMC = 7.57- 0.623MTBILL –0.303 INFF –0.109 DLEXF +0.954 LRGNP 
 
In  addition,  the  error  correction  coefficient  for  the  change  in  short  run  inflation  to  a 
disequilibrium in the longer run is much faster with calculated base money with -.979 than 
with actual reserve money with -.466 (section IIIA) which indicates that the adjustment is 
almost instantaneous, so it may be possible to conclude from here that it is the change in 
reserve  requirements  not  only  as  a  ratio  but  also  as  coverage  that  slows  down  speed  of 
adjustment of inflation to a long run disequilibrium in base money demand
1. 
 
III.A) THE SHORT RUN DYNAMICS 
 
The cointegration approach can also be used to estimate the short run equations. According to 
the representation theorem by Engel Granger (1987) cointegrated variables can be represented 
by error correction representation. 
Using the error correction term from the long run actual real base money equation, short run  
reparametrized inflation equation is written as follows: 
 DINF =- 0.466 [EC]t-1 +0.997[DDLEXF]t-1+0.574[DINF]t-2 +0.415[DDLEXF]t-2 +0.710[DINF]t-3  
   ( -2.193)                    (2.271)                                  (2.546)                      (2.880)                                ( 3.321) 
+0.011[DDLEXF]t-3+0.606[DINF]t-4+0.854[DDLEXF] t-4+ 0.422[DINF]t-5+0.096[DDLEXF]t-5 
  (3.748)                                 (2.806)                         (3.028)                                ( 1.99)                          (3.223)   
      
 +0.325 [DDLEXF]t-6 +0.569 [RBM]t-7+0.466[DDLEXF]t-7 +0.178[DDLEXF]t-8+0.273[DDLEXF]t-9 
   (3.012)                                     (1.98)                         (2.522)                                 (3.859)                                 (2.082) 
 
+0.230[DDLEXF]t-10+0.051[DDLEXF]t-11+0.512[DDLEXF]t-13+ 0.325[DINFF]t-14 
  (2.133)                                  (3.033)                                         (2.884)                           (2.023)                                                      
 
￿
The significant coefficients in change in inflation equation indicates that short run inflation is 
explained among other things by inertia i.e. its own lag starting from 2nd lag to 5th lag and 
the 14th lag, however, change in depreciation has even more lasting affect on it all the way till 
11th lag and the 13th lag, change in real base money affects change in inflation with its 7th 
lag. The error correction alpha coefficient for inflation equation is significant and negative 
                                                
1 The short run equation for inflation  for calculated base money case is mainly determined by lags of change in 
inflation as well as lags of exchange rate change, both of which are persistent with 8 lags, as well as lags 
11,12,13 with a magnitude –0.466 which is not significantly different from 0.5 which implies that the 
adjustment to long run equilibrium through inflation is not slow but rather moderate. 
Granger(1986) states that if a pair of I(1) series are  ointegrated there must be causation in at 
least one direction,  as one  variable  can help forecast the other. Also, again according to 
Granger(1988)when there is cointegration between I(1)variables, Granger causality testing 
requires  using  the  error  correction  term  from  cointegration.  Granger  causality  tests  done 
according  to  this  procedure  with  error  correction  term  indicates  that  there  is  a  bivariate 
causality between real base money and inflation with 1 lag, i.e. real base money growth 
Granger causes change in inflation with 1 lag and change in inflation causes real base money 
growth with 1 lag
2. 
 
This study finds that change in inflation is mostly affected by inertia i.e its own lags and and 
by change in exchange rate and the latter effect is rather persistent. Earlier work done on 
Turkish inflation concentrated mostly on budget deficit since it was widely believed in Turkey 
that  the  cause  of  inflation  was  fiscal  rather  than  monetary.  Metin(1998)  investigated  the 
relation between inflation and budget deficit over the1950-1987 period with annual data and 
found that budget deficits as well as real income growth and monetization significantly affect 
inflation. She had reached similar conclusion in her earlier work (1995) where she examined 
the contribution of monetary, government, goods, external and labor sectors to inflation. Her 
results  indicated that  fiscal  expansion  dominated the determination of inflation while the 
excess demand for money affected inflation only in the short run. Imported inflation and 
excess demands for assets in capital markets had some effects on cpi but goods market had no 
effects. 
A more recent study on Turkey by Ozmen and Koru (2003) however, investigates the long 
run  relation  between  budget  deficit,  inflation  and  monetary  growth  for  the  narrowest 
(currency in circulation) and the broadest monetary aggregate(m2y) using quarterly data for 
the period 1983:1 to 1999:4. Their findings that both money and inflation are endogenously 
determined, rejects the quantity theory of inflation for Turkey and their data does not support 
the direct relation between inflation and budget deficits.  
 
IV. LONG RUN DEMAND FOR REAL M2Y 
 
A similar long run demand function is estimated for Real M2Y. M2Y has in addition to 
currency in circulation, demand and sight deposits, foreign exchange deposits in it. Johansen 
test results indicate that for real m2y, there is one cointegrating vector only at 90% according 
to trace test results (table IV). 
 
Cointegration equation for  long run real m2y is 
 
LREM2Y= -18.445+0.966 LRGNP+0.310 MDEPRATE- 0.425 MTBILL-1.310 INFF+0.659DLEXF 
. 
                                                
2Dınf = 0.0031-0.42Dinf(-1)+0.14Dlrbm(-1)+-0.009 EC(-1). All the terms are significant. Akaike gives optimal 
lag as 1 and at 1lag, null of no cointegration is rejected with F(1,131)=20.22.   






 Here in addition to the variables used for explaining real base money, i.e treasury bill rate, 
inflation, change in exchange rate and real gnp, deposit rate(mdeprate) is used for the own 
rate. Not using this variable, would not get rid of autocorrelation. Mdeprate is found to be 
integrated I(1) (Table II), hence it enters the cointegration equation as is. VAR sequential 
reduction procedure for lag length selection gives 9 lags as optimal. In a sense there are 2 own 
rates here, deposit rate and change in exchange rate both of which come up as positive, due to 
existence of TL deposits as well as foreign currency deposits in the definition of M2Y. The 
other  signs  for  alternative  returns  such  as  mtbill  and  inflation  are  negative,  which  is  in 
accordance with portfolio theory. Here the magnitudes indicate that exchange rate change has 
a bigger elasticity than both the deposit rates and treasury bill rates and income elasticity is 
significantly not different than 1 and among the opportunity cost variables inflation has the 
biggest elasticity with –1.3. Weak exogeneity test results indicate that both interest rates are 
weakly exogenous while inflation and real M2Y are endogenous. 
 
IV A) THE SHORT RUN DYNAMICS 
 
The alpha coefficient for short run inflation equation is negative, significant and bigger than 
that of the real base money with –0.870 indicating a faster adjustment through inflation to a 
disequilibrium in money market in the long run than that of real base money. This probably is 
due to existence of foreign exchange deposits in M2Y and the fact that change in exchange 
rate is one of the driving forces behind inflation as well as foreign exchange deposits. 
 
DINF=-0.87[EC]t-1 - 0.42[DDLEXF]t-1+ 0.65[DMTBILL]t-2  –0.37[DDLEXF] t-2+0.63[DMTBILL]t-3 
                  (-4.30)                          (  -3.29)                                  (-2.431)                                      (-3.227)                                   (2.215)                       
 
-0.27[DDLEXF]t-3 +11.074 [DLRGNP]t-3 –0.257[DDLEXF] t-4+1.916[MDEPR]t-6+0.685[MTBILL]t-6 
-(2.539)                                         (2.37)                                              (-2.812)                                                (2.849)                                        ( 2.162 )                                        
 
-0.428[DINFF]t-6 +2.061[MDEPR]t-7+1.019[MTBILL]t-7 -.555[DINFF]t-7 + 9.842 [D LRGNP]t-7  
                (-2.156)                         (3.076)                                 (3.393)                                    (-2.982)                                 (2.136)  
 
-0.622[DINFF]t-8 







The findings of this study regarding joint endogeneity of inflation and real base money does 
not support the possibility of monetary targeting for Turkey and can be thought to give as an 
indirect support for the alternative targeting regimes instead. However, between the two other 
choices,  namely  exchange  rate  targeting  which  has  been  tried  before  and  ended  up  in  a 
disaster and inflation targeting, the latter has a better chance, even though the conditions for it 
are still not ready due to fiscal dominance, even though the Central Bank independence and 
the IMF programs after the crisis in 2000-2001 increased the governments consciousness on 
fiscal discipline. The fact that treasury bill rate comes out as weakly exogenous, indicate that 
it  is  not  determined  by  the  variables  in  money  demand  equations,  including  inflationary 
expectations, but by variables outside the model such as domestic debt stock, risk premium 
and the like. Even though the increase in debt stock in Turkey in 2000 was due to the banking 
crisis and the duty losses of public banks which was hidden under the rug until that period, still the ability to roll over domestic debt maybe problem given the political developments 
regarding  Cyprus  and  EU  negotiations.  Meanwhile,  cointegration  results  indicate  the 
existence  of  a  stable  long  run  real  base  money  and  the  resulting  inflation  equation  has 
significant error correction term and lag of real base money growth, past values of change in 
inflation  and  change  in  exchange  rates  as  the  determinants  of  inflation.  Also,  Granger 
causality test indicates a bivariate causality between change in inflation and real base money 
growth at 1 lag. Even though, the speed of adjustment in short run inflation equation from 
M2Y  cointegration  shows  a  faster  adjustment  of  inflation  to  a  disequilibrium  in  money 
market, still the Central Bank’s ability to control M2Y is much less than that of base money 
with the reserve requirement and liquidity requirement tool in its hands, while it can hardly 
change exchange rates in a floating regime, unless there is obvious speculative positions and 
the Central Bank has to intervene in the foreign exchange market, which is not an everyday 
operation. Also, cointegration relation comes up only at the 90% for real M2Y, while for base 
money it is true at 95% and even at 99%. Hence for all practical purposes and also given that 
real base money is cointegrated with real m2y at 90% (appendix), it is better to target and also 
keep an eye on the developments of base money till the conditions for inflation targeting 




































Tests For Stationarity of Real Base Money Variables 
r  DGF  CHISQ-5  LRBM  MTBILL  INFF  ￿LEXF  LRGNP 
1  1  9.40  30.11  28.21  26.84  25.07  30.21 
 
Test for Stationarity of Real M2Y Variables 
r  DGF  CHISQ-5  LRM2Y  MDEPRATE  MTBILL  INFF  ￿LEXF  LRGNP 
1  1  9.40  30.11  36.09  28.21  26.84  25.07  30.21 
 
TABLE II 
UNIT ROOT TESTS 
  VARIABLES  ADF  Lags  Constant  Trend  Critical 
Values 
  First differences         
1  ￿Inff  -4.28  13  Yes    -2.88 
2  ￿￿lexf  -5.45  13  Yes    -2.88 
3  ￿mtbill  -6.11  5  Yes    -2.88 
4  ￿mdeprate  -9.27  1  Yes    -2.88 
5  ￿LRrerm  3.68  13  Yes    -3.45 
6  ￿LRem2y  -3.34  13  Yes    -3.45 
7  ￿LRGNP  -3.34  13  Yes    -3.45 
  Levels           
1  Inff  -1.15  13  Yes  No  -2.885 
2  ￿lexf  -2.44  13  Yes  No  -2.885 
3  mtbill  -1.95  5  Yes  No  -2.883 
4  mdeprate  -2.57  1  Yes  No  -2.883 
5  LRrerm  -2.02  13   Yes  Yes  -3.45 
6  Lrem2y  0.056  13   Yes  Yes  -3.47 
7  LRGNP*  -2.44  13  Yes  No  -3.45 
 
* Seasonal unit root test for LRGNP according to Frances methodology indicate that while ￿1=0,  
￿2...... ￿12¹ 0, which implies there is only non seasonal unit root i.e. the serie is I(1). 
 




 TABLE  III 
TESTS OF THE COINTEGRATING RANK For LRBM 
E igenv  Trace  Ho: r  p-r  Trace 99%  Trace 95% 
0.2320  69.11  0  5  66.705  59.23 
0.1178  33.21  1  4  45.99  39.71 
0.0863  16.16  2  3  29.194  24.08 
 
TESTS OF THE COINTEGRATING RANK For LRM2Y 
E igenv  Trace  Ho: r  p-r  Trace 90% 
0.3032  111.43  0  6  97.17 
0.1349  62.3  1  5  71.66 
0.0863  42.58  2  4  49.91 
 
TESTS OF THE COINTEGRATING RANK BETWEEN LRBM and LRM2Y 
E igenv  Trace  Ho: r  p-r  Trace 90% 
0.0674  17.92  0  2  17.79 




TEST FOR WEAK-EXOGENEITY: for LRBM LR TEST CHISQ(r) 
r  DGF  CHISQ-5  LRBM  MTBILL  INFF  ￿LEXF  LRGNP 
1  1  3.840  4.18  1.78  3.91  3.92  3.51 
 
TEST FOR WEAK-EXOGENEITY: for LRM2Y LR TEST CHISQ(r) 
r  DGF  CHISQ-
5 
LRM2Y  MDEPRATE  MTBILL  INFF  ￿LEXF  LRGNP 
1  1  3.84  5.04  1.17  0.12  12.41  3.85  0.81 
 
 
DIAGNOSTICS For Real Base Money 
Autocorrelation Results: 
L-B(34 ) CHISQ(495) = 271.078     p val = 0.44 
LM (1) CHISQ(25) =18.506  p val = 0.91 
LM(4) CHISQ(25) = 18.506 p val = 0.82 
 
Test For Normality 
CHISQ(10) = 25.293 p-val =0.00 
 
For Short Run Inflation equation: 
Arch(15)=2.827  Normality=50.384, Rsquared=0.789 DIAGNOSTICS For Real M2Y 
Autocorrelatıon Results: 
L-B(34) CHISQ(930) = 349.992     p val = 0.12 
LM (1) CHISQ(36) =33.796  p val = 0.57 
LM(4) CHISQ(25) = 41.893 p val = 0.23 
 
 
Test For Normality 
CHISQ(12) = 146.072 p-val =0.00 
 
For Short Run Inflation equation: 






Test of known beta eq. to beta(t)
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